ABSTRACT This article explores one of the earliest centrally organized state intelligence services in world history. Contrary to the orthodoxy that sees systematized intelligence as a modern political phenomenon, this was developed in early modern Venice. The article reveals the complex organization of Venetian systemized intelligence that distinguished it from other contemporaneous states' espionage networks. It also shows how Venetian authorities commodified intelligence by engaging citizens and subjects in a trade of information for mutual benefits. Ultimately, the article challenges our understanding of early modern political communication and offers a fresh vista of intelligence as a business trait and economic necessity.
Introduction
Intelligence gathering and espionage have long fascinated the reader and, in more recent years, the historian. Official and unofficial narratives of clandestine operations, covert agents and intelligence agencies have competed for shelf-space in bookshops and libraries, to complement the ever-appealing genre of spy fiction. Indeed, historians have been scrutinizing declassified records in their efforts to produce a robust history of the subject. This, however, spans largely from the eve of The Great War to the twenty first unsystematic exploration of the ways in which intelligence emerged and evolved in its trajectory towards the contemporary state-of-the-art intelligence services. 13 Additionally, historians of intelligence have primarily focused their attention on the political and military nature of espionage. The expansionist and economic drivers that greased the wheels of strategy formulation and policy making, however, have been overwhelmingly neglected, if not ousted from the study of pre-modern intelligence. In other words, the unsystematic historical exploration of intelligence has centred on the latter's political character and implications, while the social and economic aspects of its evolution and systematization remain unchartered territory. The absence of relevant sources is often held by historians as the reason for this.
14 Yet, it is fascinating to know that already by the end of the fifteenth century governments had started to formalize information management and knowledge control. 15 This took form in the systematic organization of record keeping and archiving. 16 Archival records, therefore, exist and await exploration in order to unravel the gestation and systematization of intelligence in the pre-modern era.
While potential monographs on this subject merit consideration, this dearth has led to a misconception that sophisticated diplomacy, bureaucracy and state-organized security are characteristic of the modern state. 17 As this article will contend, this orthodoxy is no longer sustainable. Exploring records from the Archives of Venice, Simancas and London, this article will challenge this view, by revisiting one of the world's earliest centrally organized state intelligence services. This took shape and form in the premodern world, in early modern Venice. There, the systematic, corporate-like 13 One exception is Diego Navarro Bonilla's analysis of 53 political, military and diplomatic treatises of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Diego Navarro Bonilla, ' organization of bureaucracy, diplomacy and intelligence undergirded the city's commercial and maritime supremacy.
The article will start with a brief discussion of Venice's emerging administrative and bureaucratic structures that saw not only the systematic organization of information and official record-keeping, but the systemization of diplomacy and, as a result, the sophistication of secret intelligence processes. 18 It will proceed to discuss the different communication channels the Republic employed for its clandestine missions; the development and refinement of its state intelligence apparatus; and the significance of secrecy in rendering Venice one of the most supreme commercial and maritime empires in the early modern world. The article will particularly focus on the composite complexity, efficiency and corporate-like organization of Venice's intelligence apparatus that distinguished it from other contemporaneous states' espionage networks. It will also show how the Republic used the commercial mind-set of even politically excluded Venetian commoners to render them dealers in information of political consequence. In doing so, it will reveal a hitherto unknown facet of politically excluded Venetians. Ultimately, the article will advance the value of broadening and deepening the historical study of intelligence beyond the modern era and past the realm of politics.
Intelligence and Information Gathering in Early Modern Venice
In May 1591 the Venetian merchant Antonio Tizzoni visited a Venetian public notary to make a formal declaration. The document in question, drafted and also signed by Tizzoni's naval crew two years earlier in England, declared a severe incident. In 1589 Tizzoni's galley was captured by English corsairs close to the Cape of St. Vincent in the Algarve. From there, it was transported to England, where the corsairs seized a precious trunk containing paintings of the Siege of Malta. The paintings belonged to the Portuguese Don Diego di Sosa, a member of the Order of the Knights of Malta, but the looters destined them for the High Admiral of England as a gift. Notably, the value or the intention of the cargo was not deemed worthy of mention in the official document.
19
A few decades earlier a woman named Laura Troilo was making her living by entertaining eminent men as a courtesan. Courtesanry was a more refined form of prostitution, one of early modern Venice's thriving 18 On the systemization of diplomacy, see Isabella Lazzarini, 'Renaissance Diplomacy', in A. Gamberini and I. Lazzarini industries. 20 Courtesans were highly educated and sophisticated female companions of men in power. Mannerly and cultured, they were distinct from ordinary prostitutes due to their education and eloquent use of language. They were renowned for both their sexual and intellectual capacities, and it was due to the latter that they were sought by reputable men and feared by the Venetian authorities. 21 In that capacity -and in perfect fusing of the two oldest professions in the world -Laura Troilo entrapped and denounced a state official for revealing state secrets. Antonio Landi, the official in question, was serving as state secretary for the Senate. With his wife permanently in Padua, Landi frequented the residence of Troilo, where he met another one of her clients, Giovanni Battista Trevisan. Both men frequently engaged in political conversations, but to ensure secrecy, the conversations were held in Latin. Suspicious of this, Troilo informed a friend, Girolamo Amadi, who, hidden behind the bed, overheard the two plotting to communicate state secrets to the Duke of Mantua, a close friend of Trevisan's and a bitter foe of Venice. The denouncers reported the pariahs to the authorities and were handsomely rewarded for doing business with them.
22
Both these reports are representative of ways in which information of political weight was communicated in early modern Venice. 23 Upon reading them, one could contest their relevance to intelligence. After all, what do these have to do with covert operations? This seemingly simple observation encapsulates the fundamental issues associated with the study of pre-modern intelligence, that are, in fact, more complicated than a scholar of modern intelligence might envisage. Defining intelligence as a historical phenomenon is problematic. What constitutes intelligence throughout history? Is it a professional service or a civic duty? Is it a political act or an economic necessity? Actually, intelligence can be all of the above and because of its multi-valency, that is, its different manifestations in different circumstances, it means different things to different people.
In early modern Venice the term 'intelligence' meant 'communication' or 'understanding'. In this article, the term will be used to denote any kind of information of political, economic, social or cultural nature that was worthy of evaluation and meaningful decision of potential action by the government. In Venice this was made possible due to a variety of information gathering and communication channels: the political channel of the formally established governmental institutions like the Senate, the Collegio, and the Council of Ten; the commercial channel, made up of a maze of merchants' letters and reports; 24 and the personal channel, whereby individuals of all levels of society, eponymously or anonymously, collected and divulged information pertaining to state security. Although rumours and fabrications were unavoidable, the frantic existence of these composite communication channels enabled the systematic evaluation of information through the process of comparison.
25

Venice as an Information Centre
To trace the origins of modern intelligence, one must inevitably cross paths with Venice, one of the most significant commercial and maritime empires in the early modern world. Between the fifteenth and mid-sixteenth century, Venice had dominated vast parts of northern Italy, the Balkan Peninsula and the islands of the Levant. 26 Simultaneously, she had become the master of the most strategic Mediterranean and European trade routes, controlling the commerce of luxury items like silk and spices from India and Egypt. In Europe, she provided the main trade link between Germany and the Mediterranean. 27 As a result, for early modern Venice commercial and territorial supremacy were blurringly intertwined. This commercial and territorial supremacy, combined with its strategic geographical position midway between the Ottoman and the Spanish empires, placed Venice at the forefront of diplomacy's advancement and sophistication. 28 It is due to this position that Venice became the central terrain of encounters between foreign representatives seeking information on behalf of several foreign powers.
29
This was not accidental. Alongside its commercial and maritime preeminence, St. Mark's protégée gradually became the most significant agency 24 of news in the nascent modern world. 30 The fifteenth century saw the revolution of printing and publishing. Very quickly, early modern Europe became obsessed with news that arrived from all corners of the globe and made headlines on various vital affairs, like the menacing advancement of the Ottomans towards European lands; the naval expeditions to the New World; the developments of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation; and, most importantly for Venice, the prices of spices and all the other advancements of a rapidly evolving economy. 31 So, when Salanio opened the third Scene of The Merchant of Venice with the line 'What News on the Rialto?' his contemporary Venetians were well aware of the economic and political weight of this question.
While news was becoming a commodity and a craze in Europe, for Venice it was more or less business as usual, a kind of 'vernacular commerce', as Richard Mackenney pertinently termed it. 32 Already from medieval times, the Venetian government's overall orientation towards the protection of trade had led to the development of a deeply-rooted international business network of merchants, brokers and agents. 33 Recognizing the vitality of the systematic diffusion of information for commercial advancement and prosperity, the Venetians pioneered one of the world's earliest postal systems, the Compagnia dei Corrieri.
34 Merchants, as seasoned travellers and correspondents, turned into skilled reporters. Their letters home produced a kind of pre-modern 'data bank'. 35 So important was their reportage that in a letter to Charles the V, the Imperial ambassador in Venice reiterated that no news on the Turks had arrived from Venetian merchants in Constantinople, 36 that housed an established colony of Venetian traders with a permanent formal representative, the bailo. The systematic correspondence between the Venetian authorities and the bailo was overflowing with information of political and economic weight. 37 Incessantly reporting on the crucial Ottoman-Venetian relations, 38 this communication never went unnoticed or unsuspected by the Turks, and rightly so. In 1491 for instance, the bailo was expelled from Constantinople, accused of spying. 39 Indeed, he was. The fast-growing significance of information on the politics and economy of the Venetian empire rendered intelligence of any nature a determining factor in the city's commercial and territorial pre-eminence. As a result, from 1563 the Venetian Republic started to officially inform its citizens on issues that were of particular interest to merchants, Venice's lifeblood. These centred primarily on the on-going rivalry with the Ottomans. This kind of dissemination of information took the form of the world's first newspaper, the gazeta de la novità . This namesake of the subsequent eponymous journalistic term was a small monthly news publication named after the gazeta, the small copper coin disbursed to purchase it. It was literally a 'halfpennyworth of news' that could be purchased from the Rialto market. 40 The Rialto market was the economic and commercial hub of Venice. Somewhat like an early modern Wall Street, it was the financial centre of the early modern world, a vast emporium of commodities, money and news. There, the impact of harvests, wars, epidemics and shipwrecks affected the price of victuals which, in turn, determined the price of insurance premiums, public debt investment and foreign currency. 41 The news of the Portuguese's new spice route to India through the Cape of Good Hope in 1501, for instance, sky-rocketed the price of pepper in Venice within four days.
42
Reports of the seizure of Venetian galleys by the Turkish corsair Kamali in the same year shot maritime insurance rates up from 1.5 to 10 per cent. 43 So, for Venetians of all ranks who were either producing or trading commodities, news meant profit or loss. Actually, Venetians could not see a clear-cut distinction between politics and commerce, as political affairs could affect 37 Ibid. one's business and livelihood, and commercial pursuits could have diplomatic implications. 44 It is not a coincidence therefore, that their commercial and diplomatic correspondence travelled in the same saddle-bags until, in 1627, the Venetian corrieri formally petitioned for two separate sacks. 45 The Systemization of Diplomacy, Bureaucracy and Intelligence
The evolution of international politics and business was deeply influenced by the advancement of news. The latter was a by-product of the Printing Revolution that ran parallel to the Military Revolution. 46 A combination of the two led to the consolidation of theories of warfare, politics and diplomacy and their circulation in printed from. As a result, the technical 'how to' literature on efficient ruling, military and ambassadorial practice increased in volume and, gradually, significance. 47 Treatises on effective diplomatic practice started to emerge everywhere in Europe and with them came an 'increasing documentary consciousness'.
48
With diplomacy on the path of sophistication, rulers, diplomats and political thinkers steadily worked towards the systematic organization of information management processes. 49 Bureaucracy was taking shape and form and Venice was behind the wheel of this process. To ensure the efficiency of its diplomatic service, already from 1402 the Venetian authorities had established the official archive of the Republic's state secrets. This was formally named Cancelleria Secreta, the Secret Chancellery, and affectionately termed cor status nostri, the heart of our state. 50 For security purposes, the Secreta was situated in the Ducal Palace, Venice's political nucleus. Security was so stringent that even the Doge could not enter unaccompanied. Ambassadors' dispatches and any other classified reports were stored therein and governmental scribes, sworn to unyielding secrecy, meticulously copied and archived them day in day out. 51 It should not come as a surprise then, that only illiterate candidates stood a chance of appointment as the archive's guards. 52 And it is not accidental that, as part of these bureaucratic processes, the Venetian government invested on the systematic development of cryptography, cryptanalysis and steganography. The earliest collection of dispatches in the Secreta dates from 1477. It took some time for the authorities to grasp the significance of preserving these documents. Once in the sixteenth century they did, however, they systematized this process. 54 By the late sixteenth century, the gates of the Secreta were opened to officials who were tasked with penning the history of Venice. Although there was no formal equivalent of an Official Secrets Act, official historians were not allowed to consult documents of the last decade, as their relevance to current affairs rendered them classified. 55 Unquestionably, any publication of material was subject to approval by the authorities 56 and any unauthorized or uncensored publication was confiscated and destroyed. 57 In consequence, the collection, management and dissemination of information assumed strategic significance for Venice.
This significance was not solely influential in the political landscape, where most intelligence scholars have cast their focus.
58 This is because in Venice intelligence did not only serve purposes of political nature. Economic espionage that pertained to commerce and industry was as important for a capitalistic metropolis like Venice as its military equivalent. 59 This type of espionage was not new to the early modern world. The fascination with secrets of alchemy, science and nature harks back in medieval times and history is filled with instances of unauthorized seizures of technical secrets for competitive advantage. 60 The Chinese were the first victims of this form of competitive intelligence. Their secrets of silk and porcelain production were stolen by the Byzantines in the sixth century and the Jesuits in the eighteenth century, respectively. 61 The history of Venetian industry and trade abounds with cases of craftsmen and merchant spies sent abroad in order to extract information for their business affairs and the Venetian commercial community as a whole. Such state-initiated clandestine missions involved reporting on new techniques for textile, cannon, mirror and porcelain production, with the intention of stealing a march on competitors.
62
Economic and industrial counter-intelligence was even more formalized in Venice. The prospect of the flight of artisans and, in consequence, the diffusion of trade secrets was an issue that haunted the Venetian authorities for centuries. As a result, in the name of Venetian monopoly, laws were created that forbade specialist craftsmen of strategic Venetian industries like 54 ship, glass and silk production to emigrate. Disobedience was subject to civil and criminal sanctions, including death. 63 Such state regulations were mandated by the Venetian guilds, which undergirded the export of Venetian products and restricted the diffusion of technical knowledge. 64 The guild of the glassmakers, for instance, guarded specialist secrets with incredible zeal. 65 As early as 1271, any glassmaker who set up workshop outside the city was liable to a fine. By 1295 those who dared defy this regulation risked expulsion from the guild. 66 Similarly for the silk-weavers, by the 1370s their emigration was forbidden by law under the threat of one year's imprisonment and a fine. 67 This type of counter-intelligence was part of Venetian diplomats and spies' professional repertoire. In 1572 the bailo wrote of the presence in the Ottoman Arsenal of the renegade shipbuilder Nicolò Frassidonio who produced replicas of the renowned quinqueremis designed by the Venetian humanist and naval architect Vettor Fausto. 68 It seems that the Ottomans wished to boost their Navy with Venetian-like vessels, in an effort to forestall another disaster like their ignominious defeat at Lepanto the year before. 69 Writing from Genoa a century later, the governmental agent Antonio Bortoluzzi reported the relocation of five Muranese glassmakers in the city that was the perennial thorn in Venice's side. They headed thither, he stated, to 'plant a new Murano'. In a bid to higher compensation, Bortoluzzi volunteered to personally repatriate and reinstate them to the service of the Republic. 70 Evidently, already from the pre-modern era piracy had multiple meanings and manifestations. It is not a coincidence therefore, that Venice was the first European state that, as early as 1474, granted patents that permitted not only monopolistic exploitation for a period of time, but licences of service. 71 It becomes apparent that intelligence in early modern Venice was not simply the collection of information of political or military nature; it encompassed a wide spectrum of spheres, including those of economy and society. In fact, early modern Venetian intelligence emerged in the continuum between politics, economy and society and became the key determinant of the Republic's commercial and, by extension, political supremacy. 72 It is due to this continuum that the notion of intelligence, as we perceive it today, becomes blurred. A discussion of the variety of professional and amateur intelligencers that the Republic employed for its clandestine missions will help clear the murky landscape of pre-modern intelligence.
Channels and Agents of Information in Early Modern Venice
It has already become evident that for a quintessential commercial metropolis like Venice, intelligence was a major player in the city's commercial and territorial supremacy. It has also been contended that in Venice there were three main channels of information and intelligence gathering and reportage: the political, the commercial and the personal. So, who were the spies and informants of the Republic that made part of these channels? They were actually recruited from a wide spectrum of social ranks depending on their distinctive set of skills and the variety of tasks they were asked to perform.
The gradual systemization of covert communication throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be attributed to the key role embassies played on the organized flow of information through their networks. Ambassadors were instrumental in this process. 73 Venetian ambassadors were not an exception. These were noblemen who were officially sent on diplomatic missions in foreign courts and were responsible for representation, negotiation and information. 74 In a way, they professionalized the act of information gathering through their systematic collection and dispatch of detailed intelligence reports. To ensure secrecy, these were more often than not drafted in cipher. Venetian ambassadors acted as quasi-official spies for the Republic, tasked with spying on the plans and the secrets of other princes. 75 The Venetian political channel of information was not solely restricted to formal ambassadors, as was the case for other Italian states. 76 Venice's sophisticated diplomatic network extended to officially appointed representatives in Venetian cities in the Terraferma (the Venetian mainland) -the rettori; in Venetian dominated regions of the Stato da Mar (the Venetian oversees possessions) -the Proveditori; and in other areas of the Mediterranean where there was notable Venetian merchant presence -the consoli. Intelligence gathering was part of those envoys' duties and they all appointed and oversaw their individual informants in order to fulfil their responsibilities. The Venetian authorities did not micromanage this process. They received the information, channelled it back to all relevant authorities, commanded and expected execution, trusting that their delegates would see to the job. In July 1574, for instance, the rectors of Verona received orders to arrest and question three Veronese men on the grounds of a severe accusation. A French alchemist resident in the city wrote directly to the French King, warning him that the three had prepared a lethal poison for him. Undeniably, a potential assassination of the most Christian of Kings by Venetian subjects could cause a major diplomatic incident. The rectors, therefore, were instructed to have the residences of the potential culprits searched for suspicious documents, chemicals and anything that could indicate criminal action. Within two days they responded to the authorities that there was no reason to suspect those 'men of good nature' but would not free them without direct orders from Venice. Eventually, the French alchemist's letter was considered a hoax, the authorities requested no further action and the incident was buried.
77 This is just one instance of the corporate-like distribution of duties within the Venetian intelligence apparatus that set it apart from other states' intelligence operations. The latter primarily relied on the communication between the ruler and the ambassador. 78 Merchants and businessmen comprised the commercial channel of intelligence gathering and reportage. This is because secrecy and efficient intelligence had been widely regarded as key constituents of successful business affairs. Frederic Lane's famous merchant of Venice, Andrea Barbarigo, already from the 1430s had created his own cipher for confidential communication with his business agent in the Levant. 79 It should not come as a surprise then that Venetian merchants, as seasoned travellers and dealers in both merchandise and news, made perfect undercover agents for the Venetian authorities. In 1496, for instance, during the ongoing rivalry between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, the young merchant and future doge of Venice Andrea Gritti was a resident merchant in Constantinople. Aside from his commercial duties, he was charged with 76 Senatore, 'Uno Mundo de Carta'; Frigo, 'Small States'. 77 ASV, CCX, Lettere Secrete, f.9 (27 July 1574). 78 Senatore, 'Uno Mundo de Carta'; Frigo, 'Small States'. 79 The cipher is in ASV, Archivio Grimani-Barbarigo, b.41, Reg.1, c.158r. On Barbarigo, see sending intelligence of political and military nature to his motherland. To prevent suspicion, Gritti coded his intelligence in commercial lingo and presented it as business communication instead. He once reported, for instance, that he was in prison for debt but he would be released in June, meaning that the Turkish fleet was planning to set sail in that month. 80 Commercial coding proved quite a popular clandestine practice for Venetian spies. During the Fourth Ottoman-Venetian war, the Venetian authorities appointed the Jewish merchant Caim Saruch as their spy in the Sublime Porte. A skilled intelligencer, Saruch even produced -and had approved by the authorities -his own cipher, coding the Ottomans as 'drugs', their army as a 'caravan', and artillery as 'mirrors'. 81 Overall, even when not always on official covert missions, merchants were instructed to signal any suspicious manoeuvre of the enemies' ships, especially from various areas of the Middle East where they were stationed. 82 In a business-savvy state like Venice the secret services devised several tactics to utilize the personal intelligence gathering pursuits of all members of the Venetian society. 83 Clergy and Jews, the former due to social respect, the latter due to lack of it, enjoyed a relative immunity that rendered them effective covert operatives. In February 1500, for instance, a strange mission was assigned to the Jewish doctor Leon Abravanel who lived in Naples. Aside from his medical practice, Abravanel was known as a skilled astrologer. In that capacity, he was sent to Constantinople to extract information from the Sultan's astrologer. 84 Other respectable professionals like lawyers and notaries, with direct access to their clients' private affairs, acted as frequent informants to the government. Depending on the value of the communication they traded, they did not hesitate to leak information to the Spanish and French ambassadors when the opportunity arose to pad their pockets. 85 More strikingly, commoners, in their various trades and professions, were also engaged in intelligence gathering and, at times, espionage. Apothecaries, due to their pricy merchandise and, as a result, distinguished clientele, had access to information that was potentially of interest to the authorities. 86 Barber shops, where men of any rank mingled and chattered during their daily grooming routine, became hubs of political conversations and, as a result, the locals of many information dealers. 87 Travellers, soldiers and refugees were charged with sharing news about war, national politics and international affairs. 88 Residents in Venetian subject territories became local agents for the Republic on account of their linguistic abilities. Even banished criminals were frequently tasked with covert missions due to their audacious personalities. 89 One striking example of a banished felon turned secret agent is that of Giovanni Antonio Barata. In February 1571, at the break of the war with the Turks, the Republic was desperate for reconnaissance in the Ottoman capital. In need of cash, Barata did not think twice. Furnished with an extensive job description, a 'handmade' cipher for producing 'merchantstyle' letters, and instructions on using invisible ink, he was sent to Constantinople to spy on the enemy. 90 Conscious of his hazardous mission, the Venetian authorities took his wife and young children under their wing while he was on duty. For this purpose, they relocated them to the Venetian city of Bergamo and provided them with a monthly stipend which turned into a permanent yearly pension for Barata's widow when, nearly one year later, he was decapitated in Constantinople. 91 So, it is fair to say that in early modern Venice there was spying, rather than spies. This is not surprising since intelligence, as a professional service, had not yet been subjected to formal division of labour between professional activities. 92 In this respect, it is difficult to construct a clear definition of a spy in that period. The Venetian author Tommaso Garzoni, however, anticipated this challenge. In a 1587 treatise, he defined spies as 'the sort of people that, in secret, follow armies and enter cities, exploring the affairs of enemies, and reporting them back to their own people. And even if the profession is infamous and, if found, they are hung by the neck, these people are essential, as History and practice have shown'. 93 His contemporary Bartolomeo Pelliciari from Modena described spies on similar terms in his treatise on the instrumentality of good intelligence in military affairs. 94 Already by the beginning of the seventeenth century the word 'spy' had assumed negative connotations for Venetians. It was most commonly used to indicate an enemy's informant or the one that reported on the suspicious behaviour of fellow citizens. 95 In this context a spy was called spia or spione. A 1613 anonymous denunciation for instance, accused a certain Fausto Verdelli of being a spione, speaking of Venice in a despicable manner and reporting on Venetian affairs to Savoy, Loraine, Flanders, and the Spanish ambassador. 96 For linguistic distinction, one's own spies were called confidenti, 97 a term that replaced the Medieval Latin idiom explorator. 98 The remit of a confidente was by no means restricted to political or military espionage. As their innumerable surviving reports testify, they informed on any matter of state security.
One did not have to be on the government's permanent payroll to be a spy. Casually contracted informants were in high demand, as long as they were a persona fidata and prudente or a soggetto confidente (a trustworthy subject). 99 At the start of the Third Ottoman-Venetian war for instance, when communication between Venice and the Baylo or Venetian merchants in Constantinople had been broken, the authorities ordered for a persona fidel et prattica to be sent to the Sublime Porte for reconnaissance purposes.
100 All these linguistic variations indicate the different manifestations of professional and amateur intelligence gathering and espionage in the early modern era. In this respect, the term 'spy' is as loosely defined as the spectrum of early modern intelligence.
Venice's State Intelligence Service
As we have already seen, Venice's state intelligence apparatus, operating on three distinct yet composite levels, the political, the commercial and the personal, had a corporate-like character that distinguished it from the espionage networks of other Italian and European states. There, the organization, distribution and delegation of duties was orchestrated within the headquarters of the Ducal Palace by one of the most powerful executive committees, the Council of Ten. Established in 1310, the Council of Ten was the administrative body responsible for secret affairs, public order and state security. It was actually made up of 17 men, including the 10 ordinary members, six ducal councillors and the Doge at its head. It was initially tasked with protecting the government from overthrow or corruption. By the mid-fifteenth century its powers had extended so much, that it was administering Venice's diplomatic and intelligence operations, military affairs, legal matters and law enforcement. 101 This was not an easy job, yet, demonstrating an extraordinary political (and corporate) maturity, the Ten managed to oversee the internal and external security of the Venetian dominion through the meticulous organization and management of their political, commercial and private agents' intelligence operations. It is this unique complexity, efficiency and corporate-like organization of Venice's intelligence apparatus that renders it eligible for the title of the world's earliest centrally organized state intelligence service.
To safeguard the secrecy of state affairs, in 1539 the Council of Ten formed the body of the Inquisitors of the State. 102 Initially entitled 'Inquisitors against the Disclosures of Secrets', the Inquisitors of the State were a special magistracy made up of three men. Their activity encompassed all aspects of state security, including conspiracies, betrayals, public order and espionage. Most importantly, they were tasked with counter-intelligence and the supervision and protection of state secrets. The State Inquisitors played the role of a modern day 'Big Brother'; nothing and nobody escaped the ears and eyes of their spies. 103 Their confidenti were ubiquitous and, as we have seen, multifaceted. They reported on anything and anyone that could pose threats: foreign ambassadors, immigrants, gamblers, potential impostors and trouble makers, and foreign armies. 104 In fact, in a city that was an un-walled island with no court to confine secrecy, gossip thrived and the ingenuous State Inquisitors found a way to avail of this weakness for their recruitment purposes.
The Venetians were by nature seasoned businessman and skilled tattlers. With open minds and loose tongues, they had mastered the arts of business and gossip alike. This is the aspect to which the Venetian government turned in order to safeguard the cooperation of its subjects in the collection, management and dissemination of information. It did so through the medium of the supplica. The supplica was an official request for a favour: a job, citizenship, a patent and a salary increase, amongst others. In exchange, Venetians offered their services to the Republic by means of a raccordo, that is, a suggestion for an invention or a revelation of a secret that could benefit the state. The raccordi were made directly to the Ten, who were always eager to purchase weighty information. Some of the suggestions in the raccordi were so ingenuous, that in 1579 the state decided to catalogue and archive them. 105 In essence, Venetians could propose an invention or the revelation of significant information in exchange for a favour. As a result, information gathering and reportage assumed a transactional character between the government and the governed.
One characteristic example of this transactional system can be offered by the infamous Venetian womaniser Giacomo Casanova. In 1763, banished from his beloved Venice and longing to return, Casanova begun to serve the Inquisitors on a voluntary basis. Writing from London, he offered the Venetian ambassador the trial of a product that dyed cotton fabric red, an innovation at the time. This innovation, according to Casanova, would boost the production of Venetian cotton cloth and lead French and English merchants to the Venetian market. His attempt was unsuccessful, as were numerous others that followed. When nearly a decade later, however, he voluntarily exposed and halted the illegal operation of an Armenian printing house in Trieste that was competing with its Venetian counterpart, the Inquisitors granted him the longed-for revocation of his banishment.
106 Notably, Casanova's revelations had commercial, rather than political significance, demonstrating, once again, the correlation between politics and commerce for the Venetian Republic. Overall, for the city that rose from a small community of fishermen to a maritime empire built on commodities, intelligence took the form of a commercial transaction between the government and the governed, a trade as thriving, as that of spice, silk and news. It seems that Venice did not just systematize intelligence, it commodified it.
The Sanctity and Illusion of Secrecy
Unlike most early modern European states, Venice was a water-locked metropolis, confined and protected by a lagoon. It was also one of the largest cities in Europe, with a population of around 150,000 inhabitants by the midsixteenth century. 107 With no physical confines to safeguard sensitive information and a population that had one of the highest literacy rates in Europe, information was bound to slip in a maze of directions within and beyond the city's canals and circuitous streets. The lack of established degrees of exclusion, like a court, meant that information could escape the Ducal Palace and snake through the echoing calli with the same remarkable speed that it could reach it. In fact, leakage of sensitive information had many outlets. At any time that the Senate convened, 250 senators and nearly 200 nobles of the Great Council had access to these affairs. Aside from extended family networks, most of these men had an entourage of servants and gondoliers accompanying them to the Palace on a daily basis. Thirsty for gossip and its rewards, their eyes and ears were constantly wide open. 108 Information, therefore, could be overheard or directly communicated by innumerable people. The illegitimate offspring of these noblemen were particularly prone to disclosures, provided they spawned privileges that made up for their political marginalization in Venice due to their impurity.
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Venetian ambassadors constituted another vehicle through which confidential information circulated within and beyond the watery confines of the city. Before their departure for their diplomatic mission, they were granted access to the official archive of state secrets, the Secreta. There, they read their predecessors' dispatches and any other relevant records that would assist them in their diplomatic service. They were also allowed to make copies 106 that invariably leaked in various directions. Upon completion of their diplomatic missions and repatriation, ambassadors had to deliver their relazione, their end-of-mission-report, and deposit it in the Secreta. 110 The relazioni contained classified information on enemies and allies and were highly sought after by foreign ambassadors and local patricians alike. 111 In a service like the Secreta, that employed 80 -100 secretaries, disclosures were inevitable and, more often than not, profitable. Ultimately, the authors of the relazioni were willing to leak them primarily for publicity purposes. 112 The Venetian government's concerns with secrecy were, therefore, not dissimilar to seminal disclosure issues faced by contemporary governments.
Another avenue for the breach of political secrecy was the institution of the broglio, the patricians' public networking gathering. 113 The broglio took place daily in a square just outside the gates of the Ducal Palace. There, patricians exchanged news, arranged strategic alliances, and negotiated political deals. Unlike other such gatherings in courtly settings, the broglio was a public, informal and rather unstructured institution. 114 As a result, it was the target of close surveillance, especially because foreign ambassadors took the opportunity to mingle with nobles in their thirst for valuable intelligence. 115 Incidentally, Venetians serving in high-ranking offices like the Senate, the Collegio, and the Secret Councils were forbidden by law to speak to foreign ambassadors in private. Any breach of this law would incur a penalty of 1000 ducats. 116 In 1612, the English ambassador in Venice reported back to England that foreign ambassadors in the city were restricted by the same impositions. 117 To minimize contact with foreign emissaries and their entourage and to ascertain that all diplomatic communication took place only through formally approved channels, embassies in Venice were located in the periphery of the city, away from the centre. 118 Secrecy, therefore, was both an obsession and an illusion in the floating city.
Secrecy and the Myth of Venice
So, what was the obsession of Venetian authorities with secrecy? The answer can be traced in the infamous Myth of Venice. According to the sixteenthcentury eulogist Francesco Sansovino, Venice was a city unique in its grandeur, power and politics. 119 The pillar of this distinctiveness was the Myth of Venice, the view that public laws and private acts were placed at the service of the common good. At least that was the belief that the government strove to implant in Venetians' minds. As a result, Venetians enjoyed an allegedly strong sense of community and relative social harmony that brought them together in unison and concord. 120 Although the debate over the reality of the Myth of Venice is beyond the scope of this article, in effect, it was a Venetian mask portraying public good and unity triumphing over private interests and disagreements. Appearances were vital in Venice. Indeed, both internally and externally, St. Mark's protégée projected an image of a Republic where absence of civil discord went hand in hand with a sense of social serenity so deep that the city was nominated La Serenissima, the most serene of cities.
The practical manifestation of this self-perceived Myth of Venice took form in the encouragement of every Venetian citizen and subject to contribute to public good and security by gathering and divulging information pertaining to the Republic's political, economic and social stability. As a result, written denunciations were left in churches, on the stairs of public buildings and at the doorsteps of state officials, until the infamous Bocche di Leone appeared in late-sixteenth century. 121 These were pre-modern postboxes for anonymous denunciations. Literally sculpted as a lion's mouth, they served as the eyes and ears of the city. In their orifice, citizens could anonymously denounce fellow citizens on crucial issues of public order and security. 122 In compensation for their cooperation, Venetians received state protection and a dose of pride in their civic loyalty. By encouraging people of all ranks, including ordinary commoners who were excluded from political participation, to partake so indirectly in political statecraft, the Venetian authorities managed to control public behaviour, place the public on their side and ensure the smooth functioning of the state. 123 As the smooth functioning of the state was top priority, public protection and control had to be achieved by any means. Within this context, secrecy became an emblem of harmony and civil concord. Any sign of conflict or debate was deemed dangerous and had to be concealed at any cost. This was most certainly the case for the governmental assemblies, where members were forbidden by law to reveal any possible debates that took place therein. 124 When secrecy failed, the consequences could be catastrophic. In 1542, for instance, a great diplomatic scandal broke when Venetian officials leaked state secrets to the French ambassador. When a governmental delegation demanded that the ambassador hand over the culprits, his men violently assaulted them. News travelled faster than the wind within the city's streets and the incident became a cause célèbre within hours. The public took to the streets shouting and menacingly marching towards the French embassy. As a result, the authorities were forced to encircle the area with armed guards for two days. Letters were sent to the Venetian envoys in France and Constantinople requesting that the turncoats be found and punished. The Venetian ambassador in France was asked to petition the King for a new ambassador, one that was 'more dexterous in negotiation'. Importantly, the government took these prompt and drastic steps to 'appease the mayhem of the public'.
125 Doing so and showing that Venetians were an indispensable part of a state apparatus that operated for their welfare and benefit was the authorities' primary concern.
It seems plausible to hypothesize, therefore, that through the perceived triumph of the common good over personal interests, Venetian authorities managed to instil in Venetian subjects a certain degree of institutional loyalty, contrary to scholarly claims that institutional loyalty had not yet developed in the early modern period.
126 Jacob Burckhardt appositely remarked that 'no State, indeed, has ever exercised a greater moral influence over its subjects, whether abroad or at home'. 127 Could this be a proto-modern form of patriotism?
Conclusion
By the sixteenth century most Western European states had started to weave webs of diplomatic representations across and beyond the continent. 128 Venice was at the forefront of this process, having organized an efficient network of formal and informal covert operatives abroad and at home. These were charged with reporting on enemies, supporting military action, safeguarding commercial activity, and ensuring the internal stability of the state. 129 While for most Italian states such systematic communication was reserved for the ruler and his ambassadors, and for other European monarchies such processes were initiatives of individuals for personal advancement, Venice was emblematic in its centrally organized state intelligence service. In an exemplar of systematic complexity, efficiency and corporate-like organization, the Council of Ten and State Inquisitors oversaw the clandestine activities of a great variety of informants and spies. In fact, the Ten and the Inquisitors offer one of the first instances of a formal state intelligence service with a -premature, to be sure -sophisticated organization somewhat analogous to that of modern-day intelligence agencies. The notion, therefore, that centrally organized intelligence services only emerged in the modern era does no longer stand on firm ground.
Scholars have long dwelled on the study of intelligence in the era after The Great War, with a particular focus on the nature and impact of intelligence services and their operations on domestic and foreign affairs. Yet, the diffusion of information as a human behaviour is a historical phenomenon that spans from the messengers of ancient Athens to the patrons of the Enlightenment coffeehouse and beyond. It also serves purposes beyond politics and diplomacy, primarily of economic security, if not dominance. Contemporary hacking and whistleblowing practices, a topical issue for intelligence practitioners and scholars nowadays, are built on similar incentives and premises; people's need for knowledge, security and prominence. The exploration of the precursors of the highly organized modern-day state intelligence institutions, so alien to our contemporary world yet so astonishingly familiar, can yield great lessons about the need for and significance of intelligence. The challenge for the contemporary scholar is to recognize the familiar in the alien and the alien in the familiar. And it is only by doing so that we will be able to understand the fascinating ways in which intelligence developed through the centuries and the manifold purposes it served.
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